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Rn Rristotelian Definition of Friendship*
Paul Schollmeier
Aristotle's theory of friendship still holds philosophical problems
without generally accepted resolutions. One rather important yet unresolved
problem is the very problem of what Aristotelian friendship is. Is friendship
an altruistic relationship or an egoistic one? In other words, when we enter
a friendship, do we perform acts of good will for the sake of our friend or for
the sake of ourselves?
Classical philosophers resolve this problem in ways diametrically
opposed to one another.
One philosopher argues for example that all
friendship is altruistic. When we do something for them, we intend to act not
for our own benefit but for the benefit of our friends.1 But another argues
that all friendship is egoistic.
We do something with the intention of
benefiting ourselves through our friends when we act for them.2
I wish to analyze Aristotle's definition of friendship in order to show
that his conception of friendship is both altruistic and egoistic.
What we
shall see is that friendship is essentially good friendship, and that friendship
of this sort is altruistic.
For those who are good friends act with the
intention of advancing the happiness of one another.
But friendship also
includes relationships that are egoistic. Friendship is accidentally useful and
pleasant friendship, and those who are useful or pleasant friends act with the
intention of furthering their own happiness.
When he defines friendship, Aristotle states his definition more as one
might a definition of a friend:
Friends must bear good will and good wishes for one another, not
without recognition, for the sake of one of the objects discussed
( Eth. 8. 2. 1156a3-5).
This definition states what friends must do, how they must do it, and why
they must.
Friends must bear good will and good wishes, they must
reciprocate and recognize their good will and good wishes, and they must do
so for the sake of their goodness, their usefulness, or their pleasantness. For
these three qualities distinguish the lovable objects under discussion (Eth. 8.
2. 1155b18-19).
Aristotle establishes each element of his definition with a succinct
argument.
These arguments present us with an initial impression of what
each element is. He begins with the object of love:
*This paper is an excerpt from my new book, Other Selves:
Political Friendship (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).
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Not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this
seems to be either good or pleasant or useful.
But the useful
would seem to be that by means of which some good or pleasure
comes to be so that the good and the pleasant would be lovable as
ends (Eiii. 8. 2. 1155b18-21).
He states simply that love is for the sake of the lovable, and that the lovable
is divisible into the good, the useful, and the pleasant.
He adds that the
useful is a means and the good and the pleasant are ends. With this addition
he implies that his division of lovable objects is exhaustive. For the lovable
is what is immediately or mediately good or pleasant.
He next considers the elements of good wishes and their reciprocity. He
uses a counterexample to show that friendship requires good wishes and that
these wishes must be reciprocated. His counterexample contrasts friendship
with love for wine:
. . . love for a lifeless object we do not call friendship. For there
is no reciprocal love nor is there a good wish for the other. To
bear a good wish for wine would be ridiculous.
If anything, we
wish that it may keep so that we may drink it. But we say that it
is necessary to wish the good for a friend for his sake (E th. 8. 2.
1155b27-31 ).
He uses the contrast between love for a friend and love for wine to show what
a good wish in friendship is. A good wish is a wish for the sake of the object
of our wish. We apparently wish a friend well for his sake, but we do not
usually wish wine well for its sake.3
Aristotle's contrast between our love for a friend and our love for wine
also shows that a good wish in friendship is reciprocated. For a friend would
return a good wish, wine would not. Aristotle gives an another explanation
for the element of reciprocity by distinguishing between good will and
friendship:
To those who wish what is good we ascribe only good will, if the
same wishes do not arise from another.
For friendship lies in
reciprocal good will (Eth. 8. 2. 1155b32-34).
He asserts that even if we feel good will for him, we cannot yet say that we
are friends with another unless he reciprocates our good will.
Aristotle argues finally that friends must recognize their good wishes
for one another:
Or must we add that they do so not without recognition? For many
people bear good wishes for those whom they have not seen but .
suppose to be good or useful. And someone among these may feel
the same toward them. These people therefore seem to bear good
will for one another.
But how could someone call them friends2
2
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when they do not recognize how they feel about themselves (Eth. 8.
2. 1 155b34-1156a3)?
Obviously friends are aware of the good wishes borne toward one another. But
other people who bear good wishes for each other need not be aware that they
do.
In establishing each element of this definition, Aristotle would thus
appear to follow the usual sequence of events in the development of a
friendship.
We first feel affection for another person because of his
goodness, usefulness, or pleasantness. We allow ourselves to express our
affection with good will and good wishes for that person. We do him a favor,
in other words. We may then find that he reciprocates our good wishes and
good actions. And we may both eventually recognize a continued exchange of
good wishes and actions. We are then friends.
Having defined friendship, Aristotle qualifies one element of his
definition-the element of bearing good will and good wishes for another.
This qualification allows him to distinguish what he calls essential
friendship from what he calls accidental friendship. An examination of this
distinction will permit us to understand more clearly what friendship itself
is and what its species are. We shall see that friendship of one species is
altruistic, and that friendship of two species is egoistic.
Aristotle first divides friendship into its species by distinguishing the
loves exhibited in its species. He distinguishes these loves by distinguishing
their objects:
The lovable objects differ as species from one another, and
therefore so do their loves and their friendships.
There are
therefore three species of friendship, equal in number to the
lovable objects.
For in accordance with each object there is
reciprocal love and it is recognized.
Those loving one another
wish what is good to one another in the respect in which they love
each other (Eth. 8. 3. 1156a6-10).
He argues that friendship has three species. One person may bear good wishes
with reciprocation and recognition for another person as for someone good,
someone useful, or someone pleasant. For one may love another as someone
good, useful, or pleasant.
Aristotle now makes his qualification. He implies that because of these
differences in lovable objects, some friends bear good wishes for others
altruistically, and some friends bear good wishes for others egoistically.. He
argues that those whom he calls good friends act for the sake of another
essentially, for they advance the good of another itself as an end. But those
who are useful and pleasant friends act for the sake of another accidentally,3
3

for they advance the good of another only as a means to some other end of
their own.
In this argument Aristotle appears to make use of a distinction which
he explains more fully in another passages. The distinction is that between
acting essentially and accidentally. When he discusses justice, he assumes
that some one who does what is just for its own sake, does what is
essentially just. At least he clearly asserts that some one who does what is
just for the sake of something else, does what is accidentally just (Eth. 5. 8.
1135b2-8). But he explains more explicitly in his discussion of weakness of
will that when we choose or pursue one thing for the sake of another, we
choose or pursue our end essentially and our means accidentally (Eth. 7. 9.
1151a35-1151b2).
In other words Aristotle assumes that we act essentially
for the sake of an end and accidentally for the sake of a means.4
Aristotle takes up useful and pleasant friendships first.
He implies
that useful and pleasant friends bear good wishes for one another
egoistically. For he argues that useful and pleasant friends love one another
only as a means to an ulterior end of their own. Instead of loving another as
being who he is, friends of these kinds love each other as having useful or
pleasant qualities:
These people do not feel affection for another as someone loved
but as someone useful or pleasant (Eth. 8. 3. 1156a15-16).
They thus do not love one another essentially but for the sake of something
received from the other:
Those loving for the sake of utility do not love one another
essentially but rather as some good comes to be for themselves
from each other. Similarly those loving for the sake of pleasure,
for men do not feel affection for witty people for having certain
qualities but because they give themselves pleasure (£Ui. 8. 3.
11 5 6 a 1 0 -1 4 ).
These friends therefore love one another accidentally.
For they love each
other only to procure some good for themselves:
These friendships are therefore accidentally friendships, for the
person loved is not loved as the very man he is but as he furnishes
them some good or pleasure (Eth.. 8. 3. 1156a16-19).
A useful friend thus loves for the sake of his own good, a pleasant friend for
the sake of his own pleasure (Elh.· 8. 3.1156a14-15).5
Aristotle
he argues that
another for the
they wish what

implies that good friends love one another altruistically.
For
good friends love each other as an end. Good friends love one
sake of the goodness of the other. For they are good men, and
is good to each other as being good:
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Perfect friendship is the friendship of good men and of men who
are similar according to their virtue.
For they wish things that
are good similarly to each other as good men and they are
essentially good (Elb.. 8. 3. 1156b7-9).
These friends thus love one another for the sake of the other and not
accidentally:
Those who wish the good to their friends for the sake of them are
the most friends, for they do this for their sake and not
accidentally (J£UtL· 8. 3. 1156b9-11).
The one friend thus loves the other friend for the sake of the other.6
We thus see that friendship is essentially altruistic.
For it is
essentially good will and good wishes, reciprocated and recognized, for the
sake of the goodness of another. And that friendship is only accidentally good
will and good wishes, reciprocated and recognized, for the sake of the
usefulness or pleasantness of another.7
When he discusses good will itself, Aristotle also argues that we may
feel good will for the sake of another or for the sake of ourself. That is, he
distinguishes altruistic from egoistic good will.
But he does not distinguish
essential from accidental good will.
With an analogy to erotic love, he
reminds us that good will is the beginning of friendship:
Good will seems to be the beginning of friendship, as the pleasure
of sight is the beginning of erotic love. For no one loves erotically
unless he has been carried away by the form of his lover (Eth. 9. 5.
116 7 a 3 -5 ).
Continuing with his analogy, he asserts that without good will no one can be
friends, but to be friends good will by itself is not enough:
He who delights in the form of another does not yet feel erotic
love, but he does so only when he also longs for him when absent
and desires his presence. And thus it is not possible for people to
be friends unless they come to have good will, but those who feel
good will are not yet friends. For they only wish what is good for
those for whom they have good will, but they would do nothing
with them and nor would they trouble themselves for them (EUi. 9.
5. 1167a5-10).
But with time and familiarity, good will can become friendship:
Therefore someone might say metaphorically that good will is idle
friendship, and that when it is prolonged and has arrived at
familiarity, good will becomes friendship. But it does not become
friendship for the sake of utility nor friendship for the sake of
pleasure. For good will does not come to be for these things (Eth.
9. 5. 1167a10-14).
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The implication is that good will can become good friendship, for it does not
become useful or pleasant friendship.
Aristotle also explains that we feel good will for the sake of the good
qualities of another:
Generally good will come to be for the sake of virtue and goodness
when a man appears to someone to be noble or courageous or to
have a quality of such sort . . . (Eth. 9. 5. 1167a18-20).
But we do not feel good will for the sake of the useful qualities of another:
But he who wishes someone to do well in the hopes of enriching
himself through him does not seem to feel good will for him but
rather for himself, just as no one is a friend of another if he
treasures him for the sake of some utility (Eib.. 9. 5. 1167a15-18).
We apparently feel good will toward ourself, for we act for the sake of our
own benefit. Presumably we also feel good will for ourself when we act for
the sake of the pleasant qualities of another. For we would act for the sake
of our own pleasure.8
We might wish to note that friends who are essentially friends need not
appear to differ in their actions from those who are accidentally friends. For
a good friend performs good actions for another, and his friend returns the
good actions. And a useful or pleasant friend might also perform good actions
for another, and his friend might return his good actions.
But essential
friends differ greatly from accidental friends in their intentions.
Good
friends perform their good offices with the intention of advancing the good of
another.
Useful and pleasant friends perform their offices with the intention
of advancing their own good.
Aristotle does in fact argue that only because they resemble good
friendship, do useful and pleasant friendships appear to be friendship at all.
Because of their similarities to good friends, people call friends those who
love one another for the sake of utility or for the sake of pleasure:
People call friends even those who feel affection for the sake of
utility, just as cities may be called friends. For alliances among
cities seem to come to be for the sake of their own interests.
People also call friends those who feel affection for each other
for the sake of pleasure, just as children do. So perhaps we must
also say that such people are friends and that the species of
friendship are many-primarily and chiefly the friendship of good
men as good men and in the accordance with similarities, the
other species. For as having some good and some similarity, in
that respect they are friends (Eth. 8. 4. 1157a25-32).
Useful friends resemble good friends because good men are useful to one
another, pleasant friends resemble good friends because good men are6
6

pleasant to one another:
Friendship for the sake of pleasure is similar to good friendship,
for good men are pleasant to one another. Similarly friendship for
the sake of utility is too, for good men are also useful to one
another (j=ltl. 8. 4. 1156b35-1157a3).
But good friendship remains dissimilar to useful and pleasant friendship.
For good friends are useful and pleasant to one another for the sake of each
other, but useful and pleasant friends are so for their own sake.9
The fact that they differ as essential and accidental friendship also
explains why good friendship and useful and pleasant friendship have another
noteworthy difference. Good friendship is more stable than either useful or
pleasant friendship. Because they continue to be like each other, good friends
have a relationship which tends to last a long time:
Friendship of good men lasts as long as they are good, and virtue
endures (Eth. 8. 3. 1156b11-12).
But because they do not remain like each other, useful and pleasant friends do
not have a relationship which lasts as long. They last only as long as the
friends find one another useful or pleasant:
Useful and pleasant friendships are easily dissolved if the friends
do not remain like one another, for if they are no longer pleasant
or useful, they cease to love each other (Eth. 8. 3. 1156a19-21).
After they attain their own ends, useful and pleasant friends often find each
another to be no longer useful or pleasant (see also Eth. 8. 3. 1156a21-24 and
115 6 a 3 4 -1 156b1 ).
Aristotle does admit that pleasant friendship can become stable.
But
his admission only reinforces his distinction between essential and
accidental friendships:
Many pleasant friends however are constant if from familiarity
they feel fondness for their characters, these being similar (E th .
8. 4. 1157a10-12).
Pleasant friendships become stable if the friends become aware of their
characters and their characters are similar. In a word pleasant friends may
become good friends.
We would conclude then that friendship includes three species, that
good friendship is the essential species, and that good friendship is
altruistic. We would also conclude that useful and pleasant friendships are
accidental species, and that they are egoistic.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS
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Notes
h o o p e r attempts to argue that not only good friends but also useful and pleasant friends do
what is good for the sake of the qualities of one another (Cooper, "Forms," pp. 631-632).
2Adkins argues that good friends as well as useful and pleasant friends act for the sake of their
own good or pleasure (Adkins, pp. 39 and 42-43).
3lrwin suggests that we cannot wish wine well for its sake because it has no desires or aims
of its own. He argues that we can act for the sake of a friend because we can help him fulfill his aims
and desires (Irwin, E th ic s , p. 359). But I think that we can wish wine well for the sake of its
wineness. Some oenophiles seems to do so with rare vintages.
4Cooper argues that we act for the sake of the essential or accidental qualities of our friends.
He explains that essential qualities are good qualities, and they are properties which a person has
because he realizes his human nature. Accidental qualities are useful and pleasant qualities, and
they are properties which a person has because he answers to the needs of another (Cooper,
"Forms," pp. 634-635). I would argue that we cannot distinguish good friends from useful and
pleasant friends by their essential and accidental qualities. For we may find that good qualities
possessed by another are also useful and pleasant, and that the useful and pleasant qualities of
another are also good. People who are good do in fact find one another to have qualities which are at
once good, useful, and pleasant (Eib.· 8. 3. 1156b12-17).
Annas also argues that friends have essential or accidental qualities. She asserts that
essential qualities are good qualities which belong to an individual person, and accidental qualities
are useful and pleasant qualities which anyone may have (Annas, "Friendship," pp. 548-549). But
we cannot distinguish essential and accidental qualities in this way. For good qualities may belong to
anyone. Both intellectual and moral virtue are after all qualities which we possess because of our
human nature. And of course only one individual may have an useful or pleasant quality, such as an
idiosyncratic sense of humor.
5Cooper believes that all friendships are altruistic. He contends that not only good friends
but also useful and pleasant friends bear good wishes for the sake of their friends. Good friends bear
good wishes for one another for the sake of their essential qualities, and useful and pleasant friends
do so for the sake of their accidental qualities (Cooper, "Forms", pp. 631-635). He adds that good
friends really love one another for the sake of the other, and useful and pleasant friends do not. For
good friends recognize each other for whom they actually are, and useful and pleasant friends do not
(pp. 640-641). But Cooper himself eventually concedes in effect that useful and pleasant friends
do not love the accidental qualities of one another except for the sake of their own good or pleasure.
For he asserts that they dissolve their friendship if they no longer expect to receive anything from
one another (Cooper, "Forms", pp. 634, n. 1, pp. 635-638, and p. 637, n. 14).
Price agrees that Cooper severely qualifies the good will found in useful and pleasant
friendships when he states that a useful or pleasant friend must remain useful or pleasant for the
friendship to continue. And he cites the same passages (Price, ch. 5, pp. 150-151).
Cooper attempts to argue that useful and pleasant friends do not act for the sake of some good
or pleasure to be received from one another, and that these friends rather bear good wishes for the
sake of one another because of some good or pleasure already received from the other. He bases this
argument on the assumption that Hthe most natural way" to read δνά at Eth. 8. 2. 1156a3-5 and
presumably at Eth. 8. 3. 1156a14-15 is not prospectively but retrospectively. That is, a person
does not bear good wishes for another because of any hope about what the other may be or do in the
future but because of a recognition of what the other has been or done in the past (Cooper, "Forms",
pp. 6 3 2 -6 3 4 ).
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Cooper however appears to overlook an important grammatical distinction. Aristotle uses
δ ια with an accusative to signify an end and with a genitive to signify a means. He obviously uses it
with a genitive to indicate a means at EJJi. 8. 2. 1155b18-21. He asserts that the useful is β ι * o$
some good or pleasure comes to be, and that goodness and pleasure are lovable ¿s τ έ λ η . And he uses
δ ιά with an accusative at Eth. 8. 3. 1156a14-15 to indicate an end as the synonymous phrase at
1156a10-12 tells us. He says that those who love δ ιά χρ ήσ ιμον love another ζ γ ί ν ε τ α ι π
a \3 ro îs nap * άλλήλων άγαθόν. Unfortunately the phrase at 1156a12-14 is ambiguous. He says
that those who love δ ι 7 ηδονήν love ο τ ι ή δ ε ί? α ν τ ο ΐ$ . But at 1156a16-19 Aristotle asserts
that those who love κατά συμβεβηκό? love one another Ç ττορίζουσ ιν ο ι μέν άγαθόν τ ι ο ι 6*
ηδονήν.
Price cites several passages to show that δ ιά is interchangeable with έ ν ε κ α . But he
concludes that δ ιά indicates both the goal of a friendship and its ground in a friend (Price, ch. 5, pp.
151-152 and n. 27). Price too neglects to take into account the object of δ ιά and its case. But in
all the passages cited by him δ ιά does take an accusative.
Irwin agrees that δ ιά is ambiguous, but he also fails to consider the case of its object. He
only asserts that the preposition may refer to either the final cause or the efficient cause. And he
cites E th . 8. 3. 1156a31 and EUi· 10. 2. 1172b21 as examples of Aristotle using it to refer to a
final cause (Irwin, Ethics, p. 359). I would note that in both passages cited Aristotle uses δ ιά with
an accusative.
I am afraid that Cooper tries to have his friends and to turn them to good advantage too though
he himself asserts that to do so is incoherent (Cooper, "Forms", pp. 631-632). What Cooper
appears to do is to discuss mixed friendships. These friendships are good friendships in part and in
part useful or pleasant friendships. The people in these relationships sometimes act in an altruistic
way and sometimes in an egoistic way. Cooper himself actually describes them as acting in these
ways (Cooper, "Forms," pp. 638-640). But I still have to argue that Cooper describes friendships
which are predominately egoistic, for he states that the people in them part their ways if they do not
get want they want.
Price appears to agree partially. He implies that Cooper discusses mixed friendships, but he
believes that Cooper discusses mixed friendships of the wrong kind. That Cooper believes useful and
pleasant friends feel good will for the useful and pleasant qualities of another, he rightly asserts.
But he himself asserts without textual evidence that useful and pleasant friends feel good will for the
human qualities of another (Price, ch. 5, pp. 158-159 and n. 36).
Citing Cooper, Kraut also argues that Aristotle discusses mixed friendships. He argues that
to wish and to act for others for their sake is not to benefit them as a means to another end. But he
continues that the possibility of a complex motivation is left open. That is, we can benefit another in
part for his sake and in part for our sake (Kraut, Aristotle, ch. 2, pp. 78-79 and nn. 3-4). Kraut
thus implies that friendship is in part egoistic and in part altruistic. A son who benefits his father
for example also gains something for himself because he performs an ethical action (pp. 84-86).
But Kraut too describes a mixed friendship which is predominately egoistic. For he ascribes to
Aristotle the view that an agent undertakes every action for the sake of his own interest though not
always for the sake of his maximal interest. A son who helps his father may forgo an opportunity to
indulge in philosophical activity, but he takes advantage of an opportunity to engage in an morally
virtuous activity (pp. 84-86 again),
6Adkins argues that ail friendships are egoistic. He contends that all friends act for the sake
of their own good or pleasure. Good friends bear good wishes for the sake of essential qualities of one
another in order to obtain some good or pleasure for themselves, and useful and pleasant friends
bear good wishes for the sake of accidental qualities of one another in order also to obtain good or
pleasure for themselves. Adkins argues that Aristotle employs a linguistic trick to suggest a false
distinction between good friendship and useful and pleasant friendship. Aristotle suggests that good
friendship is altruistic and useful and pleasant friendships are egoistic when he opposes ε κ ε ίν ω ν
έ ν ε κ α to κα τά συμβεβηκό$ at Eth. 8. 3. 1156b7-12. For κα τά συμβεβηκό^ calls to mind the
earlier argument at 1156a16-19, which opposes
« σ τ ίν έσττερ έ σ τ ι ν ί ο ξ ττορίζο υσ ιν ο ι μεν
9
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αγαθόν τ ι oV 6 ’ ήδονην (Adkins, pp. 39 and 42-43). But Aristotle’s distinction is a true one,
and it is the same one that he used before. His distinction is between acting for the sake of another as
an end and acting for the sake of another as a means. Aristotle in fact opposes not only εκενν<*ν
ε ν ε κ α but also
with an accusative to κατά σνμβεβηκό?. For he asserts that those who wish
what is good δν ’ αυτούς do not wish what is good κατά σνμβεβηκό? at 1156b10-11.
Adkins also relies on Aristotle's argument that good friends love what is good and pleasant
both absolutely and for themselves fEth. 8. 3. 1156b12-23). He argues that a good friend bears
good wishes for another for the sake of what is good and pleasant absolutely, but that what is good and
pleasant absolutely is what is good and presumably pleasant for himself (Adkins, p. 39 and p. 39, n.
1 ). I have to concede that this passage is ambiguous. But to me Aristotle would appear to make his
usual point that what is good and pleasant absolutely is good and pleasant relatively to good men (for
example, see ¿¡Lib.. 8. 2. 1155b21-26). I would argue that what is good and pleasant relatively to a
good man who bears good wishes for another is also good and pleasant relatively to a good man who
receives good wishes from another. Only what intention he has tells us whether a good man acts for
the sake of what is good and pleasant absolutely and for him or for the sake of what is good and
pleasant absolutely and for his friend.
Adkins does cite E th . 1 . 1 . 1155a1-12 (Adkins, pp. 40-41). In this passage Aristotle
probably uses ordinary opinion to explain why we need friends. He argues that even rich men seem
to need friends to do well by and to protect their riches. And that poor men need friends to fall back
on. I find this passage to be ambiguous too. For we do not know what intentions these men have when
they help their friends. And even men in good friendships at times seek help from their friends
though they do so reluctantly (see Eitl· 9. 11. 1171b15-19).
What Adkins appears to do is to show that useful and pleasant friendships can exist between
good men. I would not deny that good men can have useful and pleasant friendships, that these
friendships can rest on their good qualities, and that these friendships can be egoistic. But I would
again argue that good men can also have good friendships, and that their good friendships can rest on
their good qualities and be altruistic.
7Without using the distinction between essential and accidental good will, Alpern agrees that
Aristotle qualifies the element of good will in his definition of friendship. What he asserts is that
Aristotle's definition is a partial and preliminary characterization of friendship. The element of
good will applies to friendship in general. But after the division of friendship into its species this
requirement wholly applies to good friendship, and it applies imperfectly to useful and pleasant
friendships. He also asserts that though all friendship requires good will, only good friendship has
good will which is disinterested. Useful and pleasant friendships do not (Alpern, pp. 309-310).
Walker too agrees that friendship in all its species does not genuinely satisfy the condition of
good will though he does not discuss essential and accidental good will either. He argues that only
good friends wish each other well for their own sakes, and that useful and pleasant friends do not
really feel affection for each other (Walker, pp. 186-187).
But he does observe that good
friendship is essentially friendship, and that useful and pleasant friendships are accidentally
friendship (p. 188).
Price agrees with Walker. But he prefers to speak not of a determinate definition which is
qualified but of a determinable definition which is presumably determined (Price, ch. 5, pp. 138140).
8Cooper argues that good will is present not only in good friendships but also in useful and
pleasant friendships. He cites JEUi. 9. 5. 1167a 10-15 to the effect that Aristotle recognizes a
spontaneous good will which arises toward someone with good character. And he implies that good
will which arises for useful or pleasant qualities is not spontaneous (Cooper, ’’Forms," pp. 632 and
641-643). But Aristotle does not divide good will into spontaneous and nonspontaneous types. What
he does is assert that good will involves only sudden and superficial fondness and does not entail doing
things together f E th . 9. 5. 1166b34-1167a3). And that love involves tension and desire and
entails fam iliarity (1 1 66 b 3 2 -3 4 ).
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Incidentally, Cooper would have to agree that Aristotle uses S \ á with an accusative at £ & . 9.
5. 1167a10-14 to indicate an end. For he translates the synonymous term è n i as "for the sake of"
(Cooper, "Forms,” pp. 641-643).
And at 1167a15-18 Aristotle obviously uses 6 ν ά with a
genitive to indicate a means.
Irwin also argues that Aristotle restricts good will to good friendship. He too cites £ lh . 9. 5.
1167a10-14. He asserts that good will in useful and pleasant friendship has an instrumental
justification (Irwin, P rin c ip le s , ch. 18, nn. 2-3). Price agrees, and he also cites E th . 9. 5.
1 167a10-14 and 1167a14-18 (Price, ch. 5, pp. 152-154).
Adkins is in agreement as well
(Adkins, pp. 4 1-42).
Citing Psy. 2. 5. 417b2-7, Couloubaritsis observes in general that one passion can become
another through alteration (Couloubaritsis, "Philia," pp. 41-42).
Couloubaritsis also offers a
specific explanation of how good will develops into friendship. Good will is an achievement of
thought which reaches its end. This achievement is an immobility which disposes us favorably
toward someone else. And in its immobility, good will tries to surpass itself by engendering
fondness (Couloubaritsis, "Philia," pp. 51-54). I would argue rather that good will itself does not
engender fondness, but that a person toward whom we feel good will occasions it. For a person who is
an object of good will is virtuous, and a virtuous person is lovable.
9The distinction between essential and accidental friendship is the key to the solution of the
problem of focal analysis. Aristotle uses the conception of focal analysis in the Eudemian Ethics to
show how the definitions of good, useful, and pleasant friendship are related to one another. The
problem is whether he also uses focal analysis in the Nicomachean Ethics to compare the definitions
of these species. The solution is that he does.
Aristotle states in the Eudemian Ethics that definitions are related by focal analysis when a
primary definition is implied by another definition, but another definition is not implied by a
primary one. He gives an example. The definition of medical doctor is implied by that of medical
instrument, but the definition of medical instrument Is not implied by that of medical doctor (Eud.
E th . 7. 2. 1236a15-33). Owens points out that Aristotle's reference to the primary definition is
graded. For the definition of medical art is also implied by the definition of medical doctor (Owens,
pp. 131-132 and n. 6).
Aristotle asserts in the Nicomachean Ethics that good friendship is primarily and chiefly
friendship, and that useful and pleasant friendships are friendship in accordance with some
similarity fNic. Eth. 8. 4. 1157a30-32). Now we can see that the definition of good friendship and
those of useful and pleasant friendship are similar because all three definitions contain the element
of good will. We can also see that the definition of good friendship is implied by those of useful and
pleasant friendships, but the definitions of useful and pleasant friendship are not implied by that of
good friendship.
For good friendship entails good will essentially, but useful and pleasant
friendships entail good will accidentally. Our assumption is that what is essentially good will is
implied by what is good will accidentally.
Owens also asserts that focal analysis is present. He argues that the human association which
is highest is imitated in lesser ways by the lower associations (Owens, pp. 132-133, n. 8). But he
does not distinguish between essential good will and accidental good will. He states only that even
though they differ essentially from the primary instance, the secondary instances are genuinely and
literally friendships (pp. 132-133, n. 8).
Gauthier offers a solution similar to mine too. He asserts that the conception of friendship is
a conception in which unity is found only In a relationship in which the unique term which realizes
it perfectly is referred to by the terms which realize it imperfectly (Gauthier and Jolif, vol. 2,
p.686). He apparently assumes that virtuous friendship is not defined in relation to useful and
pleasant friendships. At least he asserts that useful and pleasant friendships are defined in relation
to virtuous friendship (pp. 668-669).
Fraisse adds an interesting element to my interpretation. He argues in favor of focal
analysis, and he explains that good friendship alone attains its essential unity. For only in virtuous
friendship do useful and pleasant friendship find their unity. In it friendship attains its qualitative
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perfection, and toward it accidental friendship evolve (Fraise, pt. 2, pp. 225-232; see also pp.
2 0 2 -2 1 7 and 2 1 7 -2 2 6 ).
Fortenbaugh however denies that focal analysis is present in the Nicomachean Ethics. He
attempts to argue that each species of friendship is defined by its own function. Good friends have
the goal of loving each other for the sake of one another, useful friends have the goal of loving each
other for the sake of personal benefits received, and pleasant friends have the goal of loving each
other for the sake of the pleasure provided (Fortenbaugh, pp. 52-53). He according argues that the
definitions of these species are not conceptually dependent on one another (pp. 58-59).
Fortenbaugh even recognizes that good friendship rests on well wishing which is not self-interested,
and that useful and pleasant friendship rest on well wishing which is self-interested (p. 55). But
he still fails to see that good friendship is wishing what is good essentially for the sake of another,
and that useful and pleasant friendships are wishing what is good accidentally for the sake of another.
Walker agrees that good friends wish one another well for the sake of each other, and that
useful and pleasant friends do so for their own sake (Walker, pp. 186-187). He apparently would
also agree that good friendship is essentially friendship, and that useful and pleasant friendships are
accidentally friendship (p. 188). But nonetheless he does not believe that the definitions of these
three species are amenable to focal analysis because of his rather strict conception of focal analysis.
Walker argues that an element in the primary definition would have to be implied in a secondary
definition by a relative phrase. And that an element in the primary definition could not be
accidentally possessed by a secondary definition (pp. 192-194).
Price appears to argue that Walker does indeed present arguments to show that focal analysis
is present (Price, ch. 5, pp. 141-141). Yet he too ultimately denies that an analysis of this sort is
present. He apparently does so on only the slightest evidence. He notes only that the standard
adjective for good friendship in the Eudem ian Ethics are "primary" or "first", and in the
Nicomachean Ethics these adjectives are "perfect" or "complete", and that "primarily and chiefly"
are opposed to in "accordance with some similarity" at Nie. Eth. 8. 4. 1157a30-32 (pp. 137138).
But he also expresses some reservations about Aristotle's definition of focal analysis. He
despairs of a decisive solution because Aristotle does not define sufficient conditions for focal
analysis (pp. 134-137).
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